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Some Recent Developments in Canadian
Constitutional Theory with Particular
Reference to Beatty and Hutchinson

Richard F. Devlin
This article provides a critique of recent books by two prominent Canadian con
stitutional theorists - David Beatty's Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice
and Allan Hutchinson's Waiting for CORAF: A Critique of Law and Rights.
Devlin begins with a brief overview of the various positions that have been staked out
in writing on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freed oms during the last decade.
He identifies three broad constituencies: Charter advocates who assume that rights are
an "unqualified human good" and that judicial review is an important check on
majoritarian zealotry; Charter critics who emphasize the undemocratic nature of
judicial review and who doubt the beneficence of a rights-dominated regime; and
"progressive deviationists" who are somewhat nervous of both rights discourse and
judicial review but who seek to make the best of an imperfect set of constitutional
institutions. According to Devlin, Beatty and Hutchinson represent the first and
second of these positions, Beatty being a fervent advocate of the Charter and judicial
review and Hutchinson an unapologetic crtitic of both. Beatty argues that a
constitution can insulate basic rights from contamination by the contingencies of
politics, and that the courts should use the principles of rationality and
proportionality, rather than perceptions of legislative intent, in scrutinizing
government action for compliance with the constitution. Hutchinson, in contrast,
argues for what he calls a dialogic model, maintaining that because political decision
making is rooted in electoral democracy, it is more legitimate than judicial decision
making. Devlin places himself closer to Hutchinson than to Beatty, but he questions
the ability of Hutchinson's dialogic model to provide a sufficient means to move from
rights talk and social inequality to democratic and social equality.

•:• Associate Professor, Dalhousie Law School. Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law,
McGill University (1995-1996). I would like to thank several anonymous reviewers
for their critical assessments. A special debt is owed to Helene Lajeunesse.
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Introduction
In an article published at roughly the same time as the Charter1
came into force, Rod MacDonald lamented that "the summer of
1982 will undoubtedly be remembered for the quiescence of
2
Canadian legal theorists." In the ensuing 14 years the scene has
changed dramatically. There are a large number of Canadian schol
ars who approach law, and in particular constitutional law, in an
explicitly jurisprudential fashion, and they have produced an almost
unmanageable body of work. Much of it, in my opinion, is of very
3
good quality.
In the course of 1995, the University of Toronto Press published
books by two of the most prodigious constitutional theorists of the
last 15 years: David Beatty's Constitutional Law in Theory and

1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2. R.A. MacDonald, "Postscript and Prelude-The Jurisprudence of the Charter:
Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 321 at 321.
3. For an attempt to provide an overall assessment of this body of scholarship see
R.F. Devlin, "The Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory" (1997) 4 Rev. Con. Stud.
[forthcoming] [hereinafter "Anglophone Legal Theory"].
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Practice and Allan Hutchinson's Waiting for Coraf A Critique of
5
Law and Rights. Each book is an attempt by the author to pull to
gether in one volume much of their scholarship on constitutiona
lism over the last decade or so, and to hone, refine and clarify some
of their earlier work. Both succeed quite admirably. These are not
simply collections of previously published essays vaguely held to
gether by some superficial preface. Rather, they are serious attempts
by Beatty and Hutchinson to provide coherent and sustained argu
ments in pursuit of their own constitutional visions. Both books are
provocative and generate reflection and engagement; both appeal to
certain deep seated constitutional sensibilities and yet both seem
flawed - each is passionately argued but somehow they both come
across as being somewhat 'over the top'. Because of these strengths
and weaknesses they provide us with an opportunity to take a snap
shot of the state of contemporary Canadian constitutional theori
zmg.
This review essay will first attempt to locate each of the authors in
6
the broader constitutional theoretical 'langscape'. Secondly, I will
outline and then assess the persuasiveness of the arguments of each
of the authors. Finally, I will offer some tentative conclusions. It
should be noted at the outset that the ambitions of this essay are
very modest. There is no attempt to suggest that I have a better con
stitutional theory to offer; this should not be read as a ground-clea
ring prolegomenon for some new vision. What follows is an una
pologetic (but hopefully constructive) critique.

4 . D. Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1995) [hereinafter Theory and Practice].
5. A.C. Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf A Critique of Laws and Rights (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1995) [hereinafter Cora/].
6. For further discussion of legal "langscapes" see J. Youngblood Henderson,
"Mikmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada" (1995) 18 Dalhousie L.J. 196 at 205.
R.F. Devlin
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I. The Debate Over the Legitimacy of
Judicial Review and the
Constitutional Entrenchment of a
Charter of Rights
While it is true that debates about the legitimacy of judicial review
predate the Charter, there is little doubt that concerns about this
issue have taken on a particular urgency among academics in the
last 15 years. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere,7 the focus on rights
discourse and judicial review has become the dominant jurispruden
tial preoccupation for a large number of Canadian constitutional
theorists, sometimes ad nauseam. Many attempts have already been
made to delineate the various positions that might be held. Bakan is
8
manichean, splitting the terrain between sceptics and believers;
Weiler identifies pure market libertarians (a nonexistent breed in
Canada), liberal romantics, radical cynics and pragmatic pluralists/
Etherington talks about realists, liberal romantics and liberal prag
matists; 10 while Herman spotlights debunkers, promoters, reaction. u
. and pragmatists.
anes
7. "Anglophone Legal Theory", supra note 3. In this section I confine my discus
sion to Canadian legal academics, therefore ignoring the important parallel debates
among, for example, Canadian political scientists or, more generally, American legal
theorists. For a very helpful discussion of Canadian political science in this regard
see A. Dobrowolsky, "The Charter and Mainstream Political Science: Waves of
Practical Contestation and Changing Theoretical Currents" in D. Schneiderman &
K. Sutherland, eds., Charting the Consequences: 1he Impact of the Charter of Rights on
Law and Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996)
[forthcoming].
8. J.C. Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't
Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian
Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) at 445
[hereinafter Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory].
9. P.C. Weiler, "The Charter at Work: Reflections on the Constitutionalizing of
Labour and Employment Law" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 117.
10. B. Etherington, "An Assessment of Judicial Review of Labour Laws Under the
Charter: Of Realists, Romantics, and Pragmatists" (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 685.
11. D. Herman, "The Good, the Bad and the Smugly: Perspectives on the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1994) 14 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 589.
84
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As I read the literature there appear to be three broad constituen
cies: Charter advocates who assume that rights �ike the rule of law)
are an "unqualified human good" 12 and that judicial review is an
important check on majoritarian zealotry; Charter critics who
worry about the undemocratic nature of judicial review and pro
blematize facile assumptions about the beneficence of a rights
dominated regime; and progressive deviationists who, while some
what nervous of both rights and judicial review, seek to make the
best of an imperfect but potentially negotiable set of constitutional
discourses and institutions. Each of these perspectives merits further
discussion.
The dominant intellectual paradigm in Canadian jurisprudence
presumes that rights are both natural and unequivocally desirable.
Drawing on the spectre of an unfettered majoritarianism, advocates
of an entrenched Charter argue that the more rights we have, the
better. 13 Viewed from this perspective, the juridical history of
Canada is one of inexorable (if slow) improvement as we moved
from a shaky common law regime of inchoate rights, to the statu
tory recognition of rights and then to the constitutional entrench
14
ment of rights. Jurists who subscribe to such a perspective envi12. The phrase is from E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: 1he Origins ofthe Black
Act (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) at 266.
13. See T.S. Axworthy, "Colliding Visions: The Debate Over the Charter ofRights
and Freedoms" in J. Weiler & R. Elliott, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: 1he
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1980-81 (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 13;
"Liberalism and Equality" in K. Mahoney & S. Martin, eds., Equality and Judicial
Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 43; A. Bayefsky & M. Eberts, eds., Equality
Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985);
N. Lyon, "The Teleological Mandate of the Fundamental Freedoms Guarantee:
What To Do With Vague but Meaningful Generalities" (1982) 4 Supreme Court
LR. 57 [hereinafter "The Teleological Mandate"]; J. MacPherson, "Litigating
Equality Rights" in L. Smith, ed., Righting the Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights
(Saskatoon: Canadian Human Rights Reporter, 1986) 231 at 232; and J.D. Whyte,
"Fundamental Justice: The Scope and Application of Section 7 of the Charter" (1983)
13 Man. L.J. 455.
14. See D. Baker, "The Changing Norms of Equality in the Supreme Court of
Canada" (1987) 9 Supreme Court L.R. 497; D. Gibson, 1he Law of the Charter:
R.F. Devlin
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sion the Charter as a normative and institutional structure designed
to encourage both the courts and the legislators to maximize human
15
6
rights and social justice. 1 However, if there is conflict between the
legislatures and the courts, most rights advocates tend to argue that
the courts should have the last word, not only because they are
7
likely to be the strongest guardians of minority interests, 1 but also
because the Charter itself provides objective and determinative right
8
answers. 1 Importantly, many rights theorists emphasize that the
judicial enforcement of rights is grounded in principle - not policy,
.
. . .
. . or power. 19 The call 1s. for JU
po11t1cs
d1c1al "statesmansh1p"20 and
"constitutional fidelity. "21
Others, however, are uni�pressed and advance several arguments
against the ideology and practice of 'Charterization'. First, critics
argue that judicial review is undemocratic because judges are
Equality Rights (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) c. 1; W. Tarnopolsky, "The Evolution of
Judicial Attitudes" in Mahoney & Martin, ibid. at 378; and LE. Weinrib, "The
Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter" (1988) 10 Supreme Court
LR. 469 [hereinafter "Section One"].
15. W.R. Lederman, "The Power of the Judges and the New Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms" (Charter Edition) (1982) U.B.C. L Rev. 1; "Democratic
Parliaments, Independent Courts and the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms"
(1985) 11 Queen's LJ. 1; P.J. Monahan & M. Finkelstein, "The Charter of Rights
and Public Policy in Canada" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ. 501 at 507; B. Slattery, "A
Theory of the Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 701; and LE. Weinrib,
"Learning to Live With the Override" (1990) 35 McGill LJ. 541 [hereinafter
"Override"].
16. N. Lyon, "An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation" (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall
LJ. 95 [hereinafter "Constitutional Interpretation"].
17. Slattery, supra note 15; and Whyte, supra note 13.
18. D. Beatty & S. Kennett, "Striking Back: Fighting Words, Social Protest and
Political Participation in Free and Democratic Societies" (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev.
573.
19. M. Gold, "A Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry "
(1982) 4 Supreme Court LR. 131; "The Teleological Mandate", supra note· 13 at 245,
252; and "Section One", supra note 14 at 481-482 and 508-513.
20. D. Gibson, "Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
Some General Considerations" in W. Tarnopolsky & G. Beaudoin, eds., 1he
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) 25 at 28.
21. "Constitutional Interpretation", supra note 16 at 99.
86
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unelected and therefore unacr0 !11table.22 Moreover, judges are said
to be unreflective of th<" L:c:tss, race, gender, (dis)abilities, sexual ori
23
entations or poJ;ticaJ. preferences of the larger Canadian society.
Particular :1aention has been focused on the hostility of the courts
24
t<' rights claim? by unions as manifested in: Dolphin Delivery
where it was held that there is no right to secondary picketing; the
Labour Trilogy25 where it was held that freedom of association does
26
not include the right to strike; and the B. C. G.E. U. case in which
the right to picket, though recognized as a form of expression under
s. 2(6), could be justifiably restricted under s. 1.27 Inversely, the
courts are identified as having a pro-business tendency in, for
example, their somewhat formalistic and legalistic recognition of
corp9rations as persons and the correlative entitlement to the
panoply of Charter rights.28
Second, and closely related, is the argument that a public preoccu
pation with Charter and rights arguments tends to subordinate and
colonize other forms of political debate and mobilization. Such a
dynamic prioritizes litigation rather than participation29 and recon1

22. Bakan, supra note 8; W. Bogart, Courts and Country (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1993) c. 1; J. Fudge, "Labour, The New Constitution and Old
Style Liberalism" (1988) 1 3 Q ueen's L.J. 61 at 64, 68-69 [hereinafter "Old Style
Liberalism"]; and M. Mandel, The Charter ofRights and the Legalization ofPolitics in
Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: T hompson, 1994) at c. 2, 43.
23. Bakan, supra note 8.
21. R. WD.S. U. v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986) 2 S.C.R 573.
25. Reference re: Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987) 1 S.C.R. 313; P.S.A.C.
v. Canada, [1987) 1 S.C.R. 424; and R. WD.S. U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987) 1 S.C.R. 460.
26. B. C. G.E. U. v. B ritish Columbia (,4 ttomey-Genera O, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
27. Etherington, supra note 10; M. MacNeil, "Courts and Liberal Ideology: An
Analysis of the Application of the Charter to Some Labour Law Issues" (1989) 34
McGill L.J. 86.
28. A. Petter, "The Politics of the Charter" (1986) 8 Supreme Court LR. 473 at 490493; E.A. Sheehy, "Regulating Crimes and the Charter: R. v. Wholesale Travel Inc."
(1992) 3:2 J. Human Just. 111; and C. Tollefson, "Corporate Constitutional Rights
and the Supreme Court of Canada" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 309.
29. Bogart, supra note 22 at c. 1; J. Fudge, "The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of
Rights upon Political Discourse: Feminist Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada"
R.F. Devlin
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structs citizens as 'petitioners'.30 This situation is compounded by
the danger that litigational politics tends to catapult lawyers into the
position of a political vanguard; a vanguard that is disconnected
from broader social causes.31
Third, Charter politics are accused of being elitist in that only the
institutionally well positioned or the affluent can afford to utilize
2
.
the courts3 - the Lavzgne
. 33 case 1s. sa1. d to h ave cost the umons
34
about $400,000 and rumour has it that the Women's Legal
Education and Action Fund (LEAF) may have spent up to $1 mil
35
lion on A ndrews.
Fourth, it is argued that in both form and structure the Charter
advances individualism, consolidates essential capitalist legal rela
tions and undercuts solidarity and collectivism in that it favours
freedom of the individual from state intervention when a caring
society requires such state intervention to equalize and redistribute
social goods.36 Chief Ju�tice Dickson's (as he then was) liberal indi
vidualistic prognostications on the purpose of the Charter in Hunter

(1989) 1 7 Int'lJ. Soc. L. 445 [hereinafter "Sexual Violence"]; andJ. Webber, "Tales of
the Unexpected: Intended and Unintended Consequences of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms" (1993) 5 Canterbury L. Rev. 207 at 22 1-225.
30. Mandel, supra note 22 at xi-xii.
31. W. Conklin, "The End of Judicial Review" (1992) 10 Current Theory 1;
S. Razack, Canadian Feminism and . the Law: The Women's Legal Education and
Action Fund and the Pursuit ofEquality (Toronto: Second Story Press, 1 991) at 52-58.
32. G. Brodsky & S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step
Forward or Two Steps Back (Ottawa: CACSW, 1989).
33. Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 2 1 1.
34. I. Greene, The Charter ofRights (Toronto: J ames Lorimer, 1989) at 62-63.
35. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 14 3 [hereinafter
Andrews].
36. L. Apland & C. Axworthy, "Collective and Individual Rights in Canada: A
Perspective on Democratically Controlled Organizations" (1988) 8 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 44; B ogart, supra note 22 at 125; Brodsky & Day, supra note 32; R.C.
Way, "The Charter, the Supreme Court and the Invisible Politics of Fault" (1992) 12
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 128; J. Fudge, "What Do We Mean by Law and Social
Transformation?" (1990) 5 Can. J. Law. & Soc. 4 7 at 57 [hereinafter "Social
Transformation"]; A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden
Agenda" (1987) 45:6 Advocate 857; and Webber, supra note 2 9 at 2 18-221.
88
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37

39

38
v. Southam, Big M Drug Mart and Oakes are often targeted
here.40
Fifth, it is argued that the courts are an inappropriate forum for
social policy making because: a) judges are ill-equipped to deal with
large-scale social issues; b) the exceptionalism and specificity of indi
41
vidual cases unduly decontextualizes the complexity of the issues;
and c) when legalized, all public social problems tend to he re-en
coded and repackaged as issues of private individual rights which
42
can only generate zero-sum solutions. Again, labour relations are
frequently cited.
Finally, due to their abstraction, rights discourse and legal reaso
ning are identified as deeply indeterminate and therefore capable of
diverse interpretations depending on the ideological preferences of
the judges and the contexts in which such interpretations are in
voked. 43 Moreover, there is the problem of causal indeterminacy.
That is, the long term and broader social impact of a particular deci
sion or set of decisions is extremely difficult to predict.44 In short,
the symbolism of a 'rights victory' may not have any concrete so45
. 1 impact.
.
eta

37. Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc. , [1984) 2 $.C.R. 145.
38. R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M].
3 9. R. v. Oakes, [1986) 1 $.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
40. Mandel, supra note 22; and Petter, supra note 28 at 493-498.
4 1. J. Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits
to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Strnggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 485 at 548 [hereinafter "Public/Private Distinction"]; and Greene, supra
note 34 at 62-69, 222.
42. Mandel, supra note 22 at 171; Petter, supra note 28 at 478; and Webber, supra
note 29 at 225-227.
43. "Public/Private Distinction", supra note 41 at 532-533; Petter, supra note 28 at
486; and Webber, supra note 29 at 227-229.
44. Bogart, supra note 22 at c. 2, 5; "Public/Private Distinction", supra note 41 at
536; and H.J. Glasbeek, "A No-Frills Look at the Charter ofRights and Freedoms: or
How Politicians and Lawyers Hide Reality" (1 989) 9 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 293
at 349-351.
45 . J. Bakan·'& D. Pinard, "Getting to the Bottom of Meech Lake: A Discussion of
Some Recent Writings on the 1987 Constitutional Accord" (1989) 21 Ottawa L.
R.F. Devlin
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46

Dichotomies rarely capture the full panorama of perspectives.
Thus it can be suggested that distinct from the faithful and the skep
tics there may be a third categ�ry of jurists who, very roughly,
47
might be described as the 'progressive deviationists'. They are
united in a couple of beliefs. First, deviationists accept that, for bet
ter or worse, judicial review is a constitutional fact and that it is
therefore essential to focus on what can best be done with this re
configuration of social institutions. Second, they argue that rights
have no inherent or essential meaning. Rather, they are social con
structs that have been imagined and given concrete form at certain
historical conjunctures. Consequently, they are capable of being
remade in the contemporary historical moment. Third, given this
plasticity, rights can be reconceptualized, reinterpreted and rearticu
lated not solely as exclusive fences to protect the individual, but also
as relational and communitarian interests that entitle citizens to
pursue social goods. Fourth, deviationists argue that such an open
ended vision of rights can allow for significant differential t�eatment
and an expansive pluralist tolerance in constructing social, legal and
constitutional policies. Fifth, this pursuit of difference can be most
effectively achieved if citizens and judges conceive of rights claims as
part of an ongoing mutually empathetic social conversation. Sixth,
at the level of strategy, deviationists argue: a) negative rights are ex
tremely valuable for those who are still the victims of discrimina
tion; b) rights generally can serve as a medium of personal valoriza
tion; c) rights discourse can operate as a potent form of
(counterhegemonic) consciousness-raising, resistance and mobiliza
tion and, therefore, it cannot be abandoned as a potential political
platform; and d) the achievement of a rights claim can send an im
portant symbolic message to the broader society.
Rev. 247 at 260; J. Fudge & H. Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights: A Politics with
Little Class" (1992) 1 Soc. & L. Stud. 45 at 56-59; and A. Petter, "Legitimizing Sexual
Inequality: Three Early Charter Cases" (1989) 34 McGill L.J . 358.
46. B. Cossman, "'Dancing in the Dark': A Review of Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh
Day's Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step Forward or Two Steps
Back?" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 223.
47. R. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1986) at 1 5-22, 88-90.
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Herman, Nedelsky and Trakman are probably the most explicit
spokespersons for this perspective48 but I would suggest that it also
informs the legal philosophy of many feminists,49 self-described
51
egalitarian liberals50 and some post-liberals.
In their previous works both Beatty and Hutchinson have aligned
themselves with, and been primary spokespersons for, two of these
48. D. Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); J. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving
Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities" in A. Hutchinson & L. Green,
eds., Law and Community: The End of Individualism? (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at
2 1 9; J . Nedelsky, "Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self" (1990) 30 Representations
162; J. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship" (1993) 1 Rev. Con. Stud. 1;
and LE. Trakman, Reasoning With the Charter (Toronto: Butterworths, 1 992).
There are of course differences, most notably Herman's socialist feminism renders
her less optimistic than Nedelsky and Trakman. It is to be noted however that
Trakman's optimism seems to have faded as 1 995 wore on. See e.g. LE. Trakman,
"The Demise of Positive Liberty?" (1995) 6 Con. Forum 71; and LE. Trakman,
" Section 15: Equality? Where?" (1995) 6 Con. Forum 1 12.
49. See e.g. Brodsky & Day, supra note 32; M. Eberts et al., The Case for Women's
Equality: The Federation of Women Teachers Association and the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: FWTAO, 1991) c. 7; D. Greschner, "Judicial Ap
proaches to Equality and Critical Legal Studies" in Mahoney & Martin, supra note
13 at 59; M. Jackman, "Poor Rights: Using the Charter to Support Social Welfare
Claims" (1 993) 1 9 Queen's L J . 65; H. Lessard, "Relationship, Particularity, and
Change: Reflections on R. v. Morgentaler and Feminist Approaches to Liberty"
(1991) 36 McGill LJ. 263; Razack, supra note 3 1; and C. Sheppard, "Caring in Hu
man Relations and Legal Approaches to Equality" (1993) 2 N.J.C.L 305.
50. See e.g. D. Dyzenhaus, "The New Positivists" (1989) 39 U.T.L.J. 361; D.
Dyzenhaus, "Regulating Free Speech" (1991) 23 Ottawa L Rev. 289. See also
B. Slattery, "Rights, Communities and Tradition" (1991) 41 U.T.LJ. 447.
5 1. See e.g. A. Bartholomew & A. Hunt, "What's Wrong with Rights?" (1990) 9
Law & Inequality l ; P. Mackiem, "First Nations Self Government and the Borders
of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 382; R. Moon, "The Scope
of Freedom of Expression" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 331; R. Moon,
"Discrimination and its Justification: Coping with Equality Rights Under the
Charter" (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall LJ. 673; R. Moon, "Access to Public and Private
Property under Freedom of Expression" (1988) 20 Ottawa L Rev. 339; and
R. Moon, "Lifestyle Advertising and Classical Freedom of Expression Doctrine"
(1991 ) 36 McGill LJ. 76.
R.F. Devlin
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positions: Beatty as a fervent advocate for both a Charter and judi
cial review and Hutchinson as an unapologetic critic of both.
Despite these differences there are, as we shall see, certain common
alities: first, they both· accept that the words of a constitutional text
are deeply indeterminate; and second, they are both very �ritical of
the record of the Supreme Court of Canada. Where they differ is in
their interpretation of the significance of these analyses. Beatty's
project is an exercise in redemption and salvation. Hutchinson's is
an exercise in reconsideration and re-orientation. My sympathies
tend to lie with Hutchinson, though I have reservations about both.

II. Beatty's Grand Theory
A.

The Thesis Described

Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice52 is simultaneously a
rearticulation, refinement and expansion of an argument that David
Beatty has been working on for at least 10 years. Stated at its most
ambitious, his project is to provide an account of the possibility,
53
intelligibility, objectivity and integrity of law; to develop a theory
that allows us to distinguish law from politics; and finally to con
struct a mechanism that will enable us to subordinate politics to
54
law. For Beatty, constitutional law - and in particular a regime of
judicially enfo rceable rights - is the primary vehicle through which
modern society can achieve these not insubstantial feats.
More specifically, Beatty's aim is to provide a justificatory account
of what he calls "constitutional supremacy", the idea that a constitu
55
tion (a.k.a. "the mother of all laws") can provide determinative
parameters for social organization that are uncontaminated by the
56
contingencies of politics. This, of course, immediately runs into
52. Theory and Practice, supra note 4.
53. Ibid. at xi.
54. Ibid. at 9, 156.
55. Ibid. at 5.
56. Ibid. at Chapter 5.
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the difficult problem that not all constitutions share the same sub
stantive vision, organizational structure or discursive form. But
Beatty has an answer to this, one that appears to be more proce
dural than substantive. His argument is that all constitutions have
·
. herent purpose (an ".mner 1 og1c,
· " 57 perhaps even an "mner
an m
mo8
5
rality" ): they function not so much to recognize or allocate rights
5
as they do to constrain the leviathanic potential of public power. 9
This is where judicial review enters the scene. Obviously a consti
tution is not self-activating, it needs someone or something to oper
ate on its behalf. Moreover, constitutions are usually, though not
always, written in highly abstract language60 that needs to be ren
dered concrete enough to generate results in specific situations. For
Beatty this is the function of judges: to be the "guardians of the con
stitution." 6 1 But the manifest problem is the familiar question of,
who is to guard the guardians? It is Beatty's reply to this that forms
the core of his argument: the constitution itself gives rise to62 two
principles of justification that predetermine not only the scope of
63
executive, legislative and administrative power, but also judicial
power. In other words, judicial review is legitimate to the extent
64
that it "dispassionately, impartially" and "faithfully" conforms
with what Beatty calls the proportionality and rationality princi
ples.
These principles relate to both ends and means. The proportiona
lity principle (which he also describes as the consistency, anti-dis
crimination or equality principle) engages in a type of cost-benefit
analysis by inquiring whether the public interest justifies the pro-

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Ibid. at 24.
Ibid. at 157.
Ibid. at 17, 62, 151.
Ibid. at 7.
Ibid. at 95.
Ibid. at 96.
Ibid. at 15.
Ibid. at 104.
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posed limitation on an individual or group.65 In short, proportiona
lity asks if the ends are justified. The rationality principle (whicli he
also calls the necessity principle) focuses on means. It inquires
whether there are other less invasive policies or instruments avai
lable. If so, then state action can be invalidated by the courts. For
Beatty, perfection appears to entail _ minimal state intervention.66
Thus he argues that these are not simply interpretive principles, but
rather standards that impose a significant justificatory burden upon
· agents. 67
the state and 1ts
Beatty spends a great deal of effort addressing the attributes of
these principles. They appear to have two sets of qualities:
sufficient specificity and adequate determinacy to constrain judi
68
cial discretion; and, at the same time, a generality that renders
them universally valid and attractive. First, he is emphatic that
these two principles enable him to:
resurrect and defend the integrity of law, . . . [to] reveal an overarching, unified
method of constitutional review that does distinguish, in an objective and principled
69
way, between laws that are constitutional and those that are not.

Thus, he has no doubt that they are capable of guiding, bin
ding70 and even controlling71 judges, and that this justifies his
proposition that judicial review is compatible with democracy.72
Second, he· claims that the proportionality and rationality princi
ples constitute "general standards of justice."73 More ambitiously,
he proclaims that:
. . . few students take issue with the idea that Canadian constitutional law is . . .
about how two basic principles of rationality and proponionality have provided the

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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Court with the same framewc: � vI analysis from beginning to end. Nor do they
dispute the claim that rl:c�!.: principles give expression to timeless ideals of equality,
justice, and persor. ... l autonomy. The rationality requirement, which obliges all those
entr1sred witi1 the legal powers of the state to use the most moderate means possible
to pursue their political goals, maximizes the freedom of individuals and smaller
communities to control their own destinies. And the ends-oriented principle of
proportionality, or consistency guarantees a measure of equality of treatment by
insisting that whatever restrictions are imposed on personal autonomy, or the sover
eignty of one or other order of government, must be roughly equal to the kinds of
constraints others have been made to endure. 74

Moreover, Canada appears to be too provincial for the ambitions
of this theory. Beatty's aim is even grander still: to argue that "the
basic principles of constitutional law are essentially the same around
75
the world," to confirm that "principles of rationality and propor
tionality are universal in space as well as in time. "76
The book then is designed to prove the accuracy of these proposi
tions on both an empirical and a normative level. Empirically, in
Chapter Two Beatty reviews Canadian division of powers constitu
tional provisions and doctrine to identify patterns of judicial reason
ing that can be re-envisioned as somewhat inchoate, but certainly
identifiable, articulations of the proportionality and rationality
principles. Particular attention is focused on the mutual modifica
tion rule.77 In Chapter Three he argues that the Charter also reflects
these principles and that the Supreme Court recognized them in its
78
landmark decision of Oakes. More ambitiously still, in Chapter
Four, Beatty embarks on a tour of the constitutions and doctrine of
a variety of jurisdictions to uncover the transcultural pervasiveness
of the constitutional principles. In American jurisprudence he
79
analyses the strict scrutiny doctrine; in India it is the constitutional
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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discourse of arbitrariness, reasonableness and fairness; ° in Japan it is
81
the criteria of strict reasonableness and necessity; in the European
8
Court of Human Rights it is necessity82 and a European standard; 3
and finally, in Germany it is the Rechtsstaat principle84 through
which the "Court has shown its willingness to intervene in almost
every aspect of community life and to invalidate any law that is ar
bitrary, excessive, or imbalanced." 85 For Beatty, this "comparative
jurisprudence . . . gives law and these legal principles a measure of
objectivity and neutrality that transcends national borders and clif,,86
·
ferent cu1tures and environments
.
To be clear, Beatty does not argue that in all these areas of study
every judicial decision has descriptively engaged in, or relied upon, a
mode of analysis that incorporates the principles of rationality and
proportionality. Indeed, to the contrary, he is candid that in a large
number, even in the majority of the cases he has reviewed, these
principles have not been adopted. In this regard he has developed
his normative argument: it is precisely because the principles were
not applied that these decisions are constitutionally incorrect inso
far as they have been contaminated by non-constitutional
87
variables. Thus, in the context of Canadian federalism, he is
highly critical of the provincial orientation of Lord Haldane and the
88
centralism of Bora Laskin. Similarly, he argues that although the
89
Supreme Court got it right in Oakes, from about 1985 to the pres
ent, judges have been insufficiently aggressive in promoting these
principles through the Charter. Finally, in his comparative study he
80. Ibid. at 1 14.
8 1 . Ibid. at 122.
82. Ibid. at 134.
83. Ibid. at 136.
84. Ibid. at 128.
85. Ibid. at 1 3 1 . This is not Beatty's first attraction to German modes of social in
teraction. In Putting the Charter to Work (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1987) he was most impressed with the German system of labour relations as
discussed at 147-155.
86. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 105.
87. Ibid. at 126.
88. Ibid. at 60.
89. Oakes, supra note 39.
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is highly critical of the deference many courts demonstrate to the
political regimes in their own jurisdictions. His point is that the
principles of proportionality and rationality could indeed provide
the appropriate framework of constitutional analysis, if only the
judges had the wisdom to use them90 and to use them as Beatty
proposes.
Although Beatty is discouraged by his empirical findings, he re
fuses to counsel despair. In his last chapter, he reasserts the potential
of his principles to maximize human autonomy and he encourages
human rights activists to continue the struggle in the courts to force
the judiciary to be faithful to the supremacy of the constitution.
Specifically, he suggests that only lawyers who manifest a commit
ment to the principles of rationality and proportionality should be
appointed to the bench . 9 1 In sum, for Beatty, the constitution is
willing, it is only the spirit of the judges that is we� .

B.

The Thesis Criticized

Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice is an engaging and pro
vocative justification for a regime of judicially enforceable rights . In
its ambition to develop a constitutional super-theory, the book
makes bold arguments that merit careful consideration by anyone
who worries about the relationship between law, politics and jus
tice . Despite its virtues, the book is marred by several methodologi
cal and substantive problems .

90. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 17.
91 . Ibid. at 60.
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(i) Methodological Problems
Let me begin with two stylistic concerns. Beatty tells us that his
primary audience is students who are approaching constitutional
law for the first time. Throughout the book he adopts the habit of
. qmc
. kly . . . , "92 " most of
. . that "[m]ost students see quite
c1 aiming
.
my students come to see that . . . ," 93 "few students take issue
with . . . "94 some aspect of his analysis. I have two problems here.
First, this is an example of lectern empiricism. Beatty's reliance
upon such a strategy does nothing to advance his core thesis and
distracts the reader by invoking the pseudo-legitimizing authority
of hypothetical students. Second, and more problematically, the
reader must wonder about those students who do not agree, or who
take issue with Beatty's adamantly correct interpretation of
constitutional law - what is their constitutional law fate? In short,
there is a tone of the oracular in the book with the implication that
if the student/reader doesn't understand and agree, then they have
missed their constitutional salvation.
Furthermore, Beatty's quest for the holy grail of apolitical deci
sion-making entails journeys into fairly fantastic domains. For ex
ample, as he embarks on his comparative voyage, he asserts that the
.
·
. . and, personal autonomy"95 are time
1ess96
Justice
1'deals o f " equal 1ty,
and that his two principles of rationality and proportionality are
97
"universal in space as well as in time." In their best light, such
claims can only be seen as unguarded hyperbole; in their worst
light, they represent ahistorical ethnocentrism. Even the most su
perficial familiarity with the history of intellectual thought indicates
that conceptions of justice and equality shift with time, place and
culture.

92. Ibid. at 152.
93. Ibid. at 13.
94. Ibid. at 103.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid. at 104.
98
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Beyond these stylistic ,:, ,:-icerns there may also be more serious
problems of meth JC. for example, in his second chapter Beatty
addresses C'ai1adian federalism and the division of powers. This
chapter is pervaded by a sense of doctrinal presentism in that prior
to the 1980s there was a bias towards either centralism or provin
cialism, but in the last 15 years the Supreme Court has struck the
appropriate balance. For Beatty, this is a happy conjuncture because
contemporary doctrine fits with his principles and reinforces co
operative federalism at the same time. The problem here is that
Beatty fails to interrogate the virtues and possible limitations of co
operative federalism and, more importantly, its generative forces.
Co-operative federalism as a political configuration may or may not
be appropriate for late twentieth century Canada, but the point is
that it is a contingent constitutional configuration determined by a
host of social, political and economic forces. Could it not be argued
that given a different alignment of determinants, an alternative
constitutional regime from that of Beatty's principles might well be
98
desirable? However, this sort of reflection is beyond the scope of
Beatty's analysis because his exclusive focus is on constitutional
documents and judicial decisions. He pays little attention to the
formative contexts that circumscribe constitutional discourse. Con
sequently, Beatty's attacks on misconceived provincialism and cen
tralism may be too hasty for he pays insufficient attention to the
broader terrain in which constitutional modelling takes place.
These concerns about the somewhat ahistorical and decontextual
weaknesses of his method of analysis are intensified by the fourth
chapter: the comparative study. As we have seen, Beatty makes
large claims in this regard: that the principles of proportionality and
rationality transcend time and space. But the only proof he invokes
is a review of six constitutions and the dicta of several supre_me
courts. There is a significant body of comparative scholarship
98. For a similar analysis of the importance of contingency in Canadian federalism
practice and doctrine see B. Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm
in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations"
(1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308.
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which vehemently argues that the mere comparison of constitu
tional or legal texts will provide little genuine insight into other
99
legal cultures. Therefore, it may be argued that Beatty's method of
comparative scholarship is extremely elementary. Even if we were
to overlook this problem, Beatty admits that while traces of his
principles are to be found in the various constitutional regimes
which he analyzes, their influence is small. 100 However, he makes
no serious attempt to understand why this might be so. Perhaps it is
because his principles do not carry as much constitutional reso
nance for those who operate in a different jurisprudential psyche
and milieu . Rather than investigating such a possibility - a
possibility that would threaten to undermine the universality and
objectivity so crucial to his project - Beatty accuses the 'infidels' of
101
. 102 and abd1cat1on
. . of duty. 103
.
·b·l·
irrespons1
1 ity, b1as
Another methodological problem is that Beatty fails to address
contradictions between what he is saying in different parts of the
book. On occasion, he states that due to the inevitable indetermi
nacy of constitutional documents, the text really does not matter
that much because behind and beyond the constitutional phrases
104
there is always and already the inner logic of his two principles.
Indeed, he is critical of the detail of India's constitution because it
can interfere with the discovery of the real principles. 105 At other
99. See e.g. A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed.
{Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993); and J. Hill, "Comparative Law, Law
Reform and Legal Theory" (1989) 9 Oxford J . Leg. Stud. 101. I would like to thank
Prof. T. Scassa for bringing these sources to my attention. This problem is avoided
in some, but not all, of the essays in Beatty's edited collection, Human Rights and
Judicial Review: A Comparative Perspective (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1 994).
100. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 109.
1 0 1 . Ibid. at 145.
102. Ibid. at 126.
103. Ibid. at 1 10.
104. Ibid. at 38-39.
105. Ibid. at 121, 143. Indeed, I get the impression that Beatty would be most happy
with a constitution that had only two sections:
1. The Constitution is supreme.
2. All government acts must accord with the justificatory principles of
proportionality and rationality.
100
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points, however, Beatty puts a great deal of emphasis on constitu
tional texts . For example, he is extremely critical of recent Supreme
Court decisions that have limited the scope of the Charter, arguing
that there is nothing in the text to support such an interpretive
6
strategy . 10 Statements such as these reveal an assumption that con
stitutional supremacy requires textual fidelity. But if the text does
not really matter, as he suggests elsewhere, how is this possible?
Beatty's· solution to this problem not only compounds the con
tradiction, it suggests yet another methodological problem: anthro
pomorphism. In order to advance his proposition that all constitu
tions are designed to regiment excessive state power, he proclaims
. .
.
ios JU
. dges to adopt a I arge,
demand 107 and mstruct
that constitutions
liberal and purposive approach. However, Beatty provides no spe
cific reference to a particular section in support of this claim . Nor
could he because it is not the constitution which is the actor here. A
constitution is just a collection of words and conventions. A consti
tution does not demand or instruct - it is interpreted. A constitu
tion has no agency - it is a terrain of discursive struggle. Like it or
not, in a constitutional regime that adopts the practice of judicial
review, constitutional supremacy will inevitably lapse into judicial
supremacy because, as Beatty himself admits, texts are indetermi
9
nate and judges are the guardians. 10 A large, liberal and purposive
interpretive ideology, like the principles of rationality and propor
tionality, is not pregnant within a constitution. It is a gloss which
flesh and blood people like Beatty attempt to ascribe to a text.
Anthropomorphism in the service of a covert ideological position is
a strategy of avoidance, not persuasion.
A cognate problem is Beatty's employment of definitional essen
tialism whereby he avoids substantive engagement through the pre
tence that a concept or practice has one, and only one, meaning and
that this meaning is inherent in the concept. An example of this
106.
1 07.
108.
1 09.
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occurs in Beatty's discussion of

A ndrews. 1 10 In the course of his

criticism of the Supreme Court's focus on historically disadvantaged

groups, he asserts that the judges demonstrate "a deeply. flawed un
derstanding of what equality really means."111 He then proceeds to
set them straight by rearticulating a version of the 'similarly situ
ated' test. I will come back to a substantive discussion of his conc�p
tion of equality later, but my point here is that equality does not
really
cepts

mean anything. It is one of those essentially contested con

112

that have been advanced, rethought and reconfigured in

different politico-juridical contexts. Equality, in other words, is a
prism through which people struggle to articulate a particular social
vision and as such is hospitable to a plurality of constructions, each
of which is infused with certain background assumptions. Beatty is
certainly entitled to argue for the virtues of a similarly situated con
ception of equality, but that is very different from criticizing the
Court for getting it wrong on the basis of some putative inherent
meaning.
Finally, there is the methodological problem of slippage. It is ob
vious that Beatty puts great store in his two principles. However, a
close reading of the text suggests that his conception of their pedi
gre·e is highly variable. On occasion, he seems to suggest that they
are merely "formal, abstract rules of logic and practical reason
ing." 113 On other occasions, he su,ggests that they have much greater
4

normative weight as "general standards of justice" 1 1 and "universal
5

duties." 1 1 For example, he appears to believe that, if properly ap
plied, his principles might enable a court to identify a "list of policy
1 10. Andrews, supra note 35.
1 1 1 . Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 93. A similar strategy is involved when he
proposes that American judges, despite the lack of textual support in the
Constitution, have recognized that affirmative action is "inherent in the concept of
equality." Ibid. at 143.
1 1 2. See W. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts" (1956) 77 Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 167, for a discussion of the phenomenon of competing defini
tions for important societal concepts such as "work of art" or "democracy".
1 1 3. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 101. See also Beatty's discussion of the
inherently subjective application of these abstract principles by the judiciary at 146.
114. Ibid. at 104.
1 1 5. Ibid. at 142.
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objectives . . . that are beyond the constitutional competence of any
6
lawmaker or administrator to translate into law. " 1 1 At still other
points in his argument, he struggles to articulate some intermediate
posltlon,
claiming
that
their
pedigree
1s
essentially
7
'methodological' 1 1 in that they allow:
. . . the legislative and executive branches virtually unfettered discretion in the social
objectives· that they may pursue . . . (so long as) no one's freedom to live life as he or
she sees fit will be interfered with gratuitously or in a way that is out of proportion
with how others with similar interests have been treated.118

Once again, Beatty could have taken greater care in specifying more
precisely what his principles are designed to achieve.
But a prior question is: what is it about proportionality and ra
tionality that constitutes them as principles? Beatty's repeated em
phasis on their principled nature is designed to render them neutral
and apolitical and therefore distinct from policy preferences, arbi
trariness or subjective value. However, Beatty never discusses the
relevant criteria that might be used to determine if something quali
fies as a principle . I believe Beatty's interpretation of the empirical
evidence when he argues that it is possible to identify concepts and
criteria in constitutional doctrine, both at home and abroad, that
dovetail to some extent with what he calls rationality and propor
tionality. But empirical echoes doth not a principle make. It seems
to me that rationality and proportionality, and their cognate terms,
are simply two of the choices available within rhetorical discourse
that can be invoked in the 'thrust and parry' of constitutional en
gagement. If such a characterization is feasible, then the pedigree of
Beatty' s so-called principles is in no way distinct from doctrines
such as deference, political questions, etc. which Beatty portrays as
9
policy arguments. 1 1 To simply characterize something as a princi116.
117.
118.
1 19.
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ple will not do. The argument why it qualifies as a principle is mis
smg.
Or, to come at the same problem from a slightly different angle
by adopting the discourse of Beatty himself, could it not be argued
that the inner logic of Canada's constitutional order demands a
strong separation of powers and that constitutional fidelity requires
that the courts be relatively deferential on principle? Thus, judicial
121
deference rather than being irresponsible, 120 biased and an abdica
122
tion of the proper constitutional dictate may be quite principled,
depending upon one's underlying constitutional vision.
In short, without some attempt to be more methodologically ro
bust in his understanding of what constitutes a principle, Beatty's
quest for neutral principles seems unattainable.

(ii) Substantive Concerns
Beyond some of the foregoing methodological infelicities,
Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice also raises several substan
tive concerns. In particular, I am worried about Beatty's assump
tions regarding the nature of the state, equality, personhood and
group identity.
First, in the context of the Charter, it is not clear on what basis
123
Beatty is able to imbue dicta in Oakes with a talismanic aura. This
case is made to do a great deal of work in Beatty's thesis: first, it is
said to articulate relatively uncontestable social values; secondly, the
values that are proposed in the case are said to operate as constraints
upon judicial discretion.
To elaborate, Beatty focuses on the dicta in Oakes which suggest
that the purpose of the Charter is to promote:

120.
121.
122.
123.
104

Ibid. at 145.
Ibid. at 126.
Ibid. at 1 10.

Oakes, supra note 39.
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. . . respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commit,:;,-.. � :o social
justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of bel i.:[�, 1espect for cultural
and group identity, and faith in social and politic;, 1 >:.icutions which enhance the
participation of individuals and groups in soc;ety.12'

While I might agrer w ith Beatty that in the abstract these appear
to be desirab1-::! .:.ocial values, they are neither uncontroversial, nor
totct! . For example, some First Nations peoples have articulated a
different vision of social relations, one that emphasizes the social
virtues of trust, kindness, sharing and strength. 125 And when Beatty
argues that these broad social values have a strong guiding influence
26
on judicial discretion, 1 I think that he underestimates the indeter
minacy argument - an argument which, as we have seen, he relies
upon elsewhere in the book. For example, what does the 'inherent
dignity of the human person' mean? Conceivably it could mean
everything from freedom from torture to a right to social welfare,
though in the last few pages of his book Beatty excludes the lat
ter. 127 Or again, what constitutes a person? Are fetuses and corpora
tions included? Beatty's position on these; as we shall see, is hardly
beyond debate. Similarly, 'social justice' and 'equality' are open to a
plethora of interpretations as are conceptions of 'social and political
institutions which enhance participation'.
Perhaps there is no better example of the plasticity of these pur
poses than the suggestion that Canada respects "cultural and group
2
identity." 1 8 This purpose is particularly important in that group
identification seems to fit rather uncomfortably with Beatty's pri
mary premise that constitutions are driven by an ambition to
restrain the state so as to maximize individual autonomy. Indeed
1 24. Ibid. at 1 36.
1 25. See e.g. M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpre
tive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" in Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory,
supra note 8 at 5·1 7. See generally P. Monture-Angus, Thunder in My Soul: A Mohawk
Woman Speaks {Halifax: Fernwood, 1 995).
1 26. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 65-66.
1 27. Ibid. at 158-1 59.
128. Oakes, supra note 39 at 1 36.
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throughout the book, Beatty tends to play down the importance of
collective rights. They usually only appear in parentheses or as an
afterthought. 129 Nowhere does Beatty explicitly address the possibi
lity that sometimes individual autonomy may conflict with
"cultural and group identity" which, he states, are both primary
Charter purposes. 13° For example, consider the Quebec Protestant
School Board case 131 where aspects of the language provisions of
Quebec's Bill 101 132 were invalidated. Beatty discusses the case as an
example of the Supreme Court striking down legislation on the ba
sis that its ends are not justified under the proportionality principle.
Uncharacteristically, he is not particularly critical of this decision.133
Beatty seems to assume that langua·ge rights are individual rights and
that the Supreme Court legitimately invalidated this law in order to
protect the rights of anglophone individuals who sought education
in their own language. However, language can also be conceived of
as a group right 134 essential to the preservation of cultural identity
which is, according to Oakes, 135 an important Charter purpose.
Beatty fails to address the possibility that these are incompatible
constitutional visions that require substantive choices be made by
those who judge. In short, I would suggest that the purposes identi
fied in Oakes do little to effectively constrain judicial opportunities.
Indeed, an argument could be made that such dicta expand rather
. of m
.
. determmacy.
1 36
than contract the domam
A second substantive concern relates to Beatty's implicit onto
logy. Beatty is adamant that his two principles are neutral and ob129. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 1 5, 96, 101, 1 04, 1 6 0-1 6 1 .
130. Ibid. at 62, 6 6 .
1 3 l . A.G. (Quebec) v. Quebec Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 6 6 .
132. Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q. 1 977, c. C-1 1 .
133. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 72.
1 3 4. See e.g. M. Bastarache et al., Language Rights in Canada (Cowansville: Yvon
Blais, 1 987) 3-67 and C. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in A. Gutman, ed.,
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1 994) 2 5 [hereinafter "Politics of Recognition"].
135. Oakes, supra note 39.
13 6 . See generally R.F. Devlin, "Ventriloquism and the Verbal Icon: A Comment
on Professor Hogg's 'The Charter and American Theories of Interpretation"' (1988)
26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 .
1 06
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jective . But it seems to me that he overstatPS l ,i$ case. Beatty's claim
is that the purpose of the constirnt>,;-i is to put restrictions on state
power in order to maxim:zc human· freedom. 137 Thus, as we have
seen, he . is highly r::; t:1cal of Japanese judges for their deference to
. .
.
. 1ated by representative
government. 138
the publ1c m; e� est as art1cu
Indeed, he goes so far as to argue that they are biased, irresponsible
and unprincipled. But respect for the public interest may be pre
mised on a different set of assumptions about personhood and self
than those which underlie Beatty's work. In other words, the dif
ference between Beatty and some of those whom he criticizes is not
that his position is principled and theirs is not, but that his is
premised upon an individualistic ontology which envisions the self
as prior to the community whereas others may see the self as
.
.
. d by the commumty.
. 1 39 Thus, a const1tut1on
.
premised
constitute
upon a communitarian ontology may not have as its inherent
purpose the shackling of state power, but rather the facilitation of
. certain communal norms which can best be attained through a pat
tern of judicial deference to the representative will.
Beatty's problem in this regard is that he has built into his consti
tutional vision an ontological premise that is not just substantively
loaded but that is also unargued for. It is this assumption that
underpins his apparent belief that the promotion of hate literature,
pornography and even killing are prima facie protected rights under
0
s. 2(6). 14 Despite his suggestion that the focus of his theory is not
on individual rights, but the obligations and duties of the state, his
starting point remains the classical liberal shibboleth of individual
liberty. Again, my point is not so much to dispute the attractiveness
137. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 95.
138. Ibid. at 126-127.
139. See generally "Politics of Recognition", supra note 134.
140. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 90. He does acknowledge that they may be
limited by the proportionality and rationality principles as filtered through s. 1.
However, he provides little discussion of these contentious issues or, for example,
the harm principle which is itself flexible in its meaning and contestable in its scope.
Charter, supra note 1 .
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and merit of such a vision, but rather to simply highlight that this is
not a value-neutral ontological assumption.
However, on other occasions he appears to abandon, or at least
radically modify, his priorization of the individual and his assertion
that his principles are universal. Consider for example the following
discussion:
Everyone is agreed on what principles control the outcome of the case and what the
content of those rules are. The divergences occur because of different perceptions
that judges may take of the relevant factual (evidentiary) material and the legal and
cultural background against which the principles are applied. The importance of tran
quillity and civility in Japanese society, or of foetal life in the Irish Republic, for
example, may justify laws restricting street demonstrations and door-to-door can
vassing in Japan and abortions in Ireland, even though they might be struck down in
other societies, such as Canada and Denmark, where these interests and activities have
been valued quite diflerently. 141

Who does the valuing in a society such as the Republic of Ireland?
Also, whose values get counted in Beatty's constitutional calculus?
The answer I would suggest is the Catholic moral majority which,
historically, has shown little respect for women's equality rights. In
effect Beatty, in a concrete application of his principles, seems to
abandon Irish women to Ireland's cultural background at the very
moment when one would have thought that his principles might
2
have done some good work. 14
The foregoing concerns about Beatty's (selective) commitment to
an individualistic ontology also raise questions about his conception
of both the state and equality. The overall structure and tone of the
book suggests that he sees the state in a basically negative light. Its
agents are always latently threatening. But it may be that in certain
forms and practices, state agents are potentially empowering; that
their primary role is to enhance equality rather than infringe li
berty. More generally, could it not be argued that the 'inner
morality' of the Canadian Constitution is to promote equality
rather than liberty? Such an interpretation has been advanced by

1 4 1 . Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 145 [emphasis added].
142. Ibid. at 101.
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many Canadian femi!:;st� and seems to have been of interest to the
JP
Supreme Court.
Beatty appears to disagree. Consider, for example, some of the
cases he seems to applaud. In the American context he appears to
145
44
endorse cases such as Lochner v. New York, 1 Buckley v. Valeo
146
and Regents of University of California v. Bakke as they demon
strate the courts in their most bullish 147 moments, striking down
redistributive policies "that are beyond the constitutional compe. .
tence of any 1 awmaker or admm1strator
to trans1ate mto
.
1 aw. " 148
Similarly, he appears to be delighted with the fact that German
courts have struck down legislation regarding, for example, rent
control and consumer protection 1 49 thereby enhancing the rights of
property owners and commercial enterprises against tenants and
consumers.
In sharp contrast to his apparent antipathy for the state and public
power, Beatty appears to have an excessively benign opinion of pri
vate power, particularly that of corporations. He seems undisturbed
by the fact that in cases like Big M Drug Mart150 corporations bene
fitted from freedom of religion arguments. 151 He is also highly criti
cal of judicial deference to legislative regulation in both Edwards
· ·
· re1 oy 1 s3 because they are excessive m the1r
. rr
Books1 s2 and Irwm
.J

143. For a discussion of this argument see "Anglophone Legal Theory", supra note

3.

144. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
145. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
146. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
147. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 1 10.
148. Ibid. at 1 10. Beatty's position on the American Supreme Court is somewhat
ambiguous. While it is clear that he is opposed to judicial deference, ibid. at 1 10.1 1 1 ,
i t is not clear whether he prefers strict scrutiny, ibid. at 109-1 10, or the "middle
ground" of intermediate scrutiny, ibid. at 1 1 1-1 12.
149. Ibid. at 1 3 1 .
150. Big M, supra note 39.
1 5 1 . Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 68.
152. R. v. Edwards Books andArt, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
153. Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
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straint of corporate autonomy. 154 Moreover, he seems to favour
.
.
. . al protection
.
rob ust constitution
for commerc1al expressiont55 and
.
.
6
even advocates m favour of corporate access to s. 7 nghts. t5
To me this s�ggests a rather unbalanced and even decontextual
understanding of the relations of power and inequality in Canadian
society. Threats to the integrity and autonomy of the individual are
undoubtedly very real in Canadian society. But they are not neces
sarily only traceable to public state power. Private power, though
perhaps less 'in your face' is just as threatening - indeed, private
power may be considered more threatening by reason of its invisi
bility. But Beatty's theory implies that state power is prima facie
malignant whereas corporate power is presumptively benign. Nei
ther position is warranted. Power, both public and private, is
politically ambiguous. Judgments about its exercise need to be made
in context, free from the ideological imbalance built into a
public/private dichotomy. Moreover, power is relational. As such,
power is channelled and circumscribed by a host of material, insti
tutional and ideological forces. Consequently, state power can inter
sect and dovetail with private power in a multiplicity · of ways,
sometimes reinforcing it, sometimes challenging it. In short, be
cause he relies upon an insufficiently complex conception of power,
Beatty' s constitutional vision is premised on a rather conventional
(perhaps Hobbesian) understanding of social and political arrange
ments that is, once again, neither neutral nor even empowering for
human autonomy.
Currently, there exists a fairly rich philosophical literature that
suggests two traditions within liberalism: classical liberalism and
7
egalitarian liberalism. 1 5 The former priorize liberty and understand
equality as either formal equality or equality of opportunity. The
latter priorize equality and allow for significant restraints on liberty
in the pursuit of enhanced substantive social equality. The forego
ing discussion suggests that Beatty subscribes to the classical liberal
154.
155.
156.
157.
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Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 83.
Ibid. at 1 1 1-112.Ibid. at 79. See supra note 1 at s. 7.
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view . This is confirmed when we analyze how Beatty conceives of
group claims and, in particular, his thoughts on the position of
women and aboriginal people in the constitutional order.
158
As mentioned, Beatty puts great store in the Oakes case. Despite
the fact that the Supreme Court explicitly targetted group identity
in its catalogue of Charter purposes, group rights are usually men. passmg
. m
. Beatty 's work. 159 As I have pomte
. d out,
.
d on1y m
uone
Beatty does not really adequately address the possibility that there
may be conflict between individual and group rights. This claim is
reinforced when we analyze women's rights in Beatty's scheme of
things. In general, it can be said that women do not feature promi
nently in Beatty's discussion. Usually they are only mentioned in
·
·
160 o
. . 11 y
n occasion they are even rendered const1tut10na
passmg.
invisible. For example, in discussing prostitution, Beatty's primary
concern seems to be with defending the province's interest in regu
lating the quality of life in its neighbourhoods and on its streets. 161
Furthermore, the concern that women's equality rights are subor
dinate to the liberty principle is implied by the fact that Beatty
seems pleased that the Supreme Court struck down the rape shield
163 n
CT
I con. ness
prov1s1ons m seaboyer162 and sexua1 offences 1 aws m
.

..

.

158. Oakes, supra at note 39.
159. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 15, 96, 101, 104, 160-161.
160. Ibid. at 65, 1 12, 131. Some readers may think it a little unfair to criticize an
author for failing to discuss a particular issue, in this case the group rights of women
and aboriginal peoples. In reply I would simply suggest two points. First, Beatty's
failure to seriously discuss group rights is an internal flaw because it indicates that
his is a selective reading of the Oakes case. Second, the constitutional status of
women and First Nations peoples are two of the most pressing concerns for con
temporary Canadian constitutional law and potentially two of the most challenging
areas for Beatty's thesis. It is curious that a theory as ambitious as his would shy
away from such obvious concerns.
161. Ibid. at 56.
162. R. v. Seabcryer, [1991] 2 $.C.R. 577.
163. R. v. Hess, [1990] 2 $.C.R. 906. See Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 75.
These cases are a particularly good example of how constitutional norms can be at
odds and the only way to resolve the contradiction is to make a choice, a choice that
is not neutral but unavoidably ideological.
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trast, he appears to be somewhat critical of the Butler164 decision
because the court showed too much deference to the legislature. 165
Finally, there is Beatty's position on abortion. As we have seen,
Beatty appears to believe that the prohibition on abortion in Ireland
is constitutionally justified. However, he seems to support the
166 d . .
. d more conA,(
/er
morgenta
ec1s1on on th e bas1s
. th at women "game
trol over their bodies." 167 This, however, echoes the liberty and
privacy understanding of access to abortion - a viewpoint which
egalitarian feminists argue is of only limited utility to many women
because it does not impose an obligation on the state to provide
168
abortion facilities on the basis of equal access to health care. Even
in this regard, there is ambiguity in Beatty's position because, later
in the book, he is uncharacteristically descriptive of the German
Constitutional Court's 1975. abortion decision where the court took
positive steps to criminalize abortion on the basis of a right to life
16
argument. 9
Aboriginal groups and their rights seem to be even more marginal
in Beatty's constitutional vision. On occasion, there is a ·passing
170
reference to discrimination under the Indian Act and even an ex
tremely ambiguous reference to small communities controlling
171
. their own destinies. However, in the main, First Nations peoples
are ignored by Beatty. Consider again Beatty's conception of the
federal principle: it ensures that "sovereign power is divided in
Canada between two 'equal and co-ordinate' orders of government"
the effect of which is to "prevent either level from being subordi
nated and dominated by the other." 1 72 The problem here is that
164. R. v. Butler, [1992) 1 S.C.R. 452 [hereinafter Butler].
165. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 83-84.
166. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988) 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler].
167. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 101.
168. See e.g. Lessard, supra note 49.
169. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 132-133. It is worth noting that although
Beatty acknowledges in a footnote a 1993 decision there is no substantive discussion
of this later abortion case which modifies the earlier decision in quite significant
ways. Judgment of May 28th 1993, BVerfG, 88 BVerfGE 203.
170. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
171. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 100.
172. Ibid. at 26. See also page 61.
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Beatty's constitutional analysis starts in 1867 and therefore ignores
crucial constitutional concerns that predate this moment. Thus,
there is no reference to the prerogative treaties or the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 173 which are constitutional documents that
many First Nations peoples and even members of the Supreme
174
Court believe to be of vital importance. Moreover, these docu
175
ments raise crucial questions about the rights of peoples which
appear to fit quite uncomfortably within Beatty's constitutional
order, grand though it may be.
In sum, one of the most remarkable things about Constitutional
Law in Theory and Practice is the certitude with which Beatty ad
vances his core argument: that the principles of proportionality and
rationality can provide neutral and universal parameters for consti
tutional decision-making that are sufficiently determinative to cur
tail judicial megalomania. The optimism manifests itself in a multi
tude of ways: in the suggestion that the constitutional text means
very little; in the argument that although the Supreme Court of
176
Canada has been "erratic and inconsistent"
in recognizing and
adopting his principles in the federalism context, "over time the
·
.
courts are . . . gettmg better at the JO
. b" ; 177 m
. the be 1·1ef, that desp1te
the fact that in the Charter context the courts' approach has been
·
·
178
.
. hts
and the resuItant protection
of human ng
ummpress1ve
180 .
179
· d upon; m
" am b'1guous at best, " the courts shouId stl·11 be re11e
the proposition that, in spite of themselves, courts everywhere sub
scribe to the two principles; and in the conception of reform which
173. 1he Royal Proclamation, 1763 (U.K.), R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 1.
174. See e.g. Henderson, supra note 6.
175. M. Asch & P. Macklem, "Aboriginal Peoples and Canadian Sovereignty: An
Essay on R. v. Sparrow" (1991) 29 Alea. LR. 498, and P. Macklem, "Distributing
Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples" (1993) 45 Stanford L. Rev.
1311.
176. Theory and Practice, supra note 4 at 50.
177. Ibid. at 54.
1 78. Ibid. at 74-84, 106.
179. Ibid. at 106.
180. Ibid. at 99.
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suggests that all that is required is a personnel change. 181 Beatty's
optimism leads him to conclude that "fortunately . . . both the in
tegrity of law and the efficacy of the courts are still within our
·
power to contro1 ." 182 But who 1s
. th'1s we and how are we to ef£ectively control a wilful judiciary? Given the record of the courts, as
it has been presented to us by Beatty, why should we have confi
183
dence? In short, Beatty' s argument is a call for faith in the possi
bility of perfectionism. But if I refuse to take the leap it is not be
cause my choice is wrong in some constitutional sense, it is because
to my agnostic mind, history is a better predictor of the future than
prophetic pronouncements.

III. Hutchinson's Groundless Theory
A.

The Argument Described

If Beatty's conception

of constitutional law and judicial review is
strikingly jejune, Hutchinson's is decidedly jaundiced. As the subti
tle of Waiting for Cora/ 84 makes clear, it is an exercise in critique
rather than refurbishment. While Beatty believes in universal prin
ciples which can lay a solid foundation for autonomous legal
decision-making, Hutchinson's commitment is to antifound
ationalism. This is the epistemological proposition that there is no
prepolitical or transcendental location from which we can claim
legitimacy based on neutrality. 185 His argument is that because there
are no independent grounds for legal or political decision-making,
we need to seek legitimacy for our practices and institutional
arrangements in a new and hitherto unexplored way.
Constitutional law, in his view, is driven by certain historically spe181. Ibid. at 59.
182. Ibid. at 57.
183. See also J.C. Bakan, "Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legiti
macy in Canadian Constitutional Thought" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 123.
184. Cora/, supra note 5.
185. Ibid. at 121, 158.
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186
cific ideological preferences and judicial review is an illegitimate
exercise of power because structurally anJ discursively it is elitist
and unaccountable. 187 Demo -racy rather than liberty 1s
Hutchinson's 'lode star'.
Hutchinson bre�k:. his analysis into three parts. Chapter One out
lines some. i.::tirly large claims. Chapters Two to Five constitute a
crit.ique of contemporary Canadian constitutional law and legal
theory. And Chapters Six to Eight tentatively map out an alterna
tive path which decentres both law and judicial review in favour of
an invigorated democratic politics.
Hutchinson structures his argument as an allegory to Samuel
88
Beckett's existentialist classic, Waiting For Godot, 1 in which
Vladimir and Estragon wait endlessly and pointlessly for the ever
absent Godot. Hutchinson argues that most Canadian lawyers and
jurists await the coming of CORAF (The Charter of Rights and
Freedoms) in the same way, believing that eventually liberal legalism
will guarantee social justice. However, this is a false hope, a tragic
farce, 189 because liberal legalism has underlying assumptions and
commitments which make it constitutively incapable of facilitating
the social transformations that are required to achieve a more just
society. Specifically, Hutchinson proposes that the Charter, as
liberal legalism's 'crowning jewel\ is an especially nefarious barrier
to the pursuit of social justice for several reasons:

•
•
•

186.
187.
188.
189.

it priorizes individual liberty at the expense of the social good;
it fetishes the rhetoric of rights at the expense of a discourse of
·responsibility;
it is dependent upon the invocation of a public/private
dichotomy that insulates private power while undermining the
possibilities of progressive public power;

Ibid. at 24.
Ibid. at 22.

S. Beckett, Waiting/or Godot (New York: Chelsea House, 1 987).
Cora/, supra note 5 at 228.
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•

•

institutionally, it confers far too much power on an unrepre
sentative and unaccountable elite whose identity, training and
experiences render them unsuited to the pursuit of substantive
social equality; and
rights discourse is deeply indeterminate and therefore incapable
of bearing the w:eight that Charter advocates would impose
upon 1t.

In order to terminate this farce and bring u·s back to reality, 190
. postmodern 19 1
Hutch.mson attempts to construct an alternative
. exercise,
. 192 does not ascn.be to
drama. Th.1s play, th.1s poetic
1
Canadians the role of mere spectators. 93 Rather, it brings us all
onto the enlarged stage of a reconstructed state and gives us the op
portunity to script our own lines and lives as authors and
empowered citizens: it is a radical participatory democracy prem
ised upon and committed to a dialogic ethos. In turn, this generates
an expansive conception of a constitution as something larger than,
and quite distinct from, historical documents and formal institu
tions:
A constitution is an organic process through which states determine the kind of
society and citizens that they are and can become. It embraces the dynamic efforts of
people to negotiate and establish the institutional and substantive terms of their
collective existence . . . It is not a one-time event or a purely practical act of political
will. It is an enduring moment and continuing occasion through which societies,
sometimes as much by default as design, constitute themselves and define the tempo
rary circumstances and transitory possibilities of their existence. While the formal
documents and conventions of nationhood represent a privileged resolution of con
stitutional debate, each attempt to interpret and reinterpret that compromise gives
fresh meaning and effect to it. At the same time, the efforts of workers and the poor
to achieve better social programs and a fairer distribution of wealth should also be
counted as constitutional expressions. Thus constitutionalism embraces the practical
and the utopian, the institutional and the ideological, the real and the imagined, the
past and the future. It is the heart of politics . . . 194
190.
191.
1 92 .
193.
194.
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In sum, fr-:- �Iutchinson, the fact that we find ourselves without
detenr.;nate foundational truths should not be a cause for panic or
despair. To the contrary, groundlessness can free us from the myth
of necessitarianism - the conflation of the actual with the inevita
ble. By clearing this space, antifoundationalism can provide us not
just with the opportunity, but also with the responsibility to pursue
.
_a more JUSt and ega1·1tanan
. soc1.al order. 19s
In Chapter Two, Hutchinson develops his central deconstructive
move: the argument that rights talk is indeterminate. The reason
why this is crucial is obvious from the preceding discussion of
Beatty. Conventional wisdom, "Corafianism" in Hutchinson's
terms, 196 is premised upon two assumptions: a) the belief that rights
concretize transhistorical principles that are substantively neutral
with regard to citizens' conceptions of the good, because their
function is simply to ensure that each person's autonomy is un
touched so long as it does not harm another; and b) that in mo
ments of contestation rights are specific enough to provide judges
with determinative correct answers that inhibit them from impos
ing their own politicized conception of the good. Hutchinson
launches a five-pronged argument to demonstrate that these as
sumptions are indefensible. He claims:
There is no neutral standpoint from which to identify who are to be the recipients
of such rights . . .
There is no non-political way of arriving at what particular group of rights are to be
recognized and enforced . . .
There is no uncontroversial means of determining the scope and nature of each par·
ticular right . . .
There is no method internal to the theory of rights that can be used to adjudicate
upon the clash of competing rights . . .
The recognition that rights are fundamental, but not absolute, gives rise to the diffi
culty of balancing the public interest against the individuals' claims.197

1 95. Ibid. at 164.
196. Ibid. at 22.
1 97. Ibid. at 29.
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In Chapter Three, Hutchinson moves from his deconstruction of
Charter doctrine and rights discourse to a critique of Beatty and
Conklin. In his opinion, these scholars seek to defend that which he
has demonstrated to be indefensible. His basic thesis is that these
"Corafians" subscribe to a formalism that attempts to repress rather
than acknowledge that it is ideology which inevitably drives all
forms of decision-making including judicial review. 198 Objectivity is
impossible 199 because interpretation is contingent on the "identities
200
and so the Rule of Law is
and interests of the interpreters"
20 1
inescapably and undemocratically the rule of lawyers. Rationali
zation rather than reason is the hallmark of law talk.
Although Hutchinson believes that rights discourse is indetermi
nate and cannot be salvaged for the tasks of liberal legalism, he is
quick to point out that indeterminacy should not be confused with
normative neutrality. Thus in Chapters Four and Five, via discus
sions of poverty, abortion and liberalism's conception of the state,
he identifies three particularly significant problems with rights dis
course: a) its proclivity for individualism; b) its tendency for ab
straction; and c) its reliance upon an incoherent public/private
dichotomy. Hutchinson claims that the re-encoding of public social
problems as a question of private legal rights means that the speci
ficities of unequal power relations are ignored and the possibility of
202
structural reorganization is presumptively excluded. The result is
that rather than being empowered by rights discourse, women and
poor people are marginalized and even rendered juridically invisi
ble. Hutchinson suggests that a better, post-liberal approach to the
problems of abortion and poverty would focus more on social
needs and communal solidarity; reconceive the nature of the con
temporary state; and strive to enhance the space for choices that are
203
genuine rather than structurally coerced. In particular, the com-

198.
. 199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

118

Ibid. at 85 .
Ibid. at 86.
Ibid. at 60.
Ibid. at 74.
Ibid. at 95, 101.
Ibid. at 108.
22 Queen's Law Journal

204

mitment to "autonomy, participation, and substantive equality"
will require the corralling of corporate and patriarchal power.
Hutchinson claims such changes are not likely to be triggered by
the judiciary for they are within the thrall of the classic liberal as
205
sumptions. The only hope is active democratic participation .
In his sixth chapter, before moving to a substantive discussion of
his revised constitutional system, Hutchinson addresses the argu
ments of Langille, Nedelsky and Trakman . They appear to go part
way with him, but cannot bring themselves to abandon either
rights talk or the practice of judicial review . Once again the charge
is formalism,206 though dressed up in some form of jurisprudential
attire: pragmatism, relationalism or socialism. However, for
Hutchinson all these arguments fail to pay sufficient attention to his
core credo: judicial empowerment is the antithesis not the apotheo
sis of an unmodified civic democracy.207 As practitioners and en
208
forcers of a "falsely privileged mode of discourse," judges are part
209
of the problem, not part of the solution .
The final two-and-a-half chapters are given over to a tentative
mapping of Hutchinson's own preferred constitutional vision, ele
ments of which have been foreshadowed by his critique. His recon
structive project proposes, at a minimum, a two pronged strategy:
working within law and working without law.
While Hutchinson is highly critical of law, he is not cynical about
it.210 His is a position of progressive, responsible and strategic
.
. .
211
.
. "212 one wh'1ch recognizes
and " mmdfu1 moderauon,
scepticism
that law is not going to fade away, but at the same time, one that
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Ibid. at 153.
Ibid. at 153.
Ibid. at 155, 168.
Ibid. at 168, 173.
Ibid. at 171.
Ibid. at 1 68.
Ibid. at 173.
Ibid. at 158, 173, 175.
Ibid. at 177.
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wants to see law's imperialistic ambitions curtailed. More precisely
still, he suggests that law, like the state, is multifaceted and can take
various forms some of which are more in line with his democratic
21
project, 3 and some of which are anathema to it. For example, re
vitalized juries and local justice commissions would support his
project while judicial review would undermine it. Indeed, he real
izes that in Canada the constitutional die of judicial review has been
.
.
.
.
cast and that " occasional strategic advantage"214 may be obtamed via
litigational politics. He illustrates this program of postmodern pro
215
gressive lawyering through a discussion of R. v. Morgentaler.
However, Hutchinson is at pains to emphasize that litigational poli
tics on the basis of rights should only be relied upon in the most
dire circumstances for even success can result in deradicalization
through partial incorporation. He therefore proposes that legal
talents could be put to better use, for example, in the pursuit of
legislative reform and enhanced democratic processes.216 What is to
be avoided is the reaction of lawyers who automatically assume that
going to court is the only available strategy. Such a reaction rein
forces the vicious cycle in which needs are translated into rights that
can only be determined by judges who are not only unaccountable
but insensitive to the discourse of needs and substantive equality.217
So, according to Hutchinson, the primary struggle for progres
sives is to shrink the sphere of influence of law, rights discourse and
218
an illegitimate judiciary and fill that void with the "untried possi
bilities of dialogic democracy."219 His "general theory of democratic
dialogism"220 is a sophisticated argument that is difficult to con
dense. Basically, Hutchinson argues that political discourse carries a
greater presumption of legitimacy than legal discourse because it is

213.
. 214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
2 1 9.
220.
1 20

Ibid. at 1 72.
Ibid. at 174.

Morgentaler, supra note 167.
Cora/, supra note 5 at 182.
Ibid. at 108.
Ibid. at 1 53.
Ibid. at 185.
Ibid. at 189.
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· based upon democracy.221 Participatory democracy is preferable to
representative democracy because it is more immediate in its
responsiveness to the citizenry. Participatory democracy is best
conceived of as a dialogue between members of the community.
Note, however, that for Hutchinson language is not simply a me
dium, it is always and already a political process that incorporates
some important solidaristic norms.222 Dialogue, by its nature, is less
individualistic and libertarian than rights discourse because it is
premised upon intersubjectivity.223 By this Hutchinson means that
the parties to a conversation are in a relationship of "shared com.
. on• the pursuit
m1tments
and mutua1 understand'mgs"224 m
. of their
226
225
This implies an ethos of solidarity,
going negotiations.
. 12
22s
.
. 2-19 Democratic
.
equa1 1ty,- 7 respons1·b·l·
1 tty,
canng and shanng.
· d1alogue is structurally less hierarchical and potentially more inclusive
than law talk because it is not premised upon the idioms of an elitist
caste. Furthermore, Hutchinson suggests that the more citizens par
ticipate in democratic discourse, the more they will feel
empowered.230 In turn, this sense of empowerment reinforces our
capacity to rethink the nature of the state: not simply as a set of
homogeneous governmental institutions. but "as a site and structure
for the creation of the exercise of power"231 that cannot be captured
by some putative public/private dichotomy.
To develop these claims a little more concretely, Hutchinson re
visits and recasts the debate around free speech and, in particular,
focuses on the dangers of constitutionally entrenching the right of
221. Ibid. at 74-75.
222. Ibid. at 191.
223. Ibid. at 204.
224. Ibid. at 197.
225. Ibid. at 227.
226. Ibid. at 189.
227. Ibid. at 212.
228. Ibid. at 216.
229. Ibid. at 188.
230. Ibid. at 216.
231. Ibid. at 208.

R.F. Devlin

121

'
commercial speech. The argument appears to be that in Canada the
greatest threat to human autonomy and social equality at the end of
the twentieth century comes from corporate power not state
power: we tend to priorize our identity as consumers over our
identity as citizens.232 According to Hutchinson, an empowered
democratic polity would take citizenship seriously and would there
fore allow fo r significant legislative and administrative restrictions
on corporate expression because it tends to silence other forms of
speech. In other words, dialogic democracy focuses less on the right
. and more on the ".mteracttve
. . ,,233 that can
. cond1t1ons
to expression
234
make engaged and egalitarian conversation possible. Indeed, posi
tive steps could be taken to create discursive space fo r those who,
historically, have been silenced.235 Constitutionally entrenched and
judicially enforced rights can only serve as a bulwark against such
democratic goals and should therefore be discarded.236
Hutchinson concludes the book by calling on us to quit the farce
of CORAF. He admits there are no guarantees that we will end up
in a better situatfon. However, he assures us that an empowered
democracy rather than judicial supremacy is the "least worst match
237
with the non-foundationalist project." In that way, citizens in all
their diversity would at least be able to participate in constructing
their future rather than, like Estragon and Vladimir, · being para
lyzed waiting for a salvation that will never come.

B.

1be A rgument Criticized

The reader will probably sense that in terms of philosophical dis
position, political commitment and jurisprudential affiliation my
position is much closer to Hutchinson than to Beatty. However,
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
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Hutchinson's proJect 1s also vitiated by several problems, some
.
.
quite senous.

(i) Stylistic and Methodological Problems
On occasion Hutchinson's tendency to lapse into excessive rhetoric
can cause him problems both minor and substantive. In relation to
the former, he portrays the debate over the Charter and judicial
review as a struggle of epic proportions with a comparison to the
dispute between "Galileo and the Italian establishment."238 More
seriously, Hutchinson's self-confessed "apostolic"239 zeal can lead
him to overstate his case. Consider the claims that "rights talk has
.
.
. day,"240 that " ng
hts talk flatters to dece1ve"241 and that he
had its
favours "the virtues of democratic dialogue over the vices of rights
242
talk." The problem here is that this may be a false dichot�my,
forcing upon us an either/or position243 that is neither attractive
nor politically feasible. Feminist engagements with rights discourse
is enlightening in this regard. For example, in the course of an ar
gument that rights talk has "proved sorely inadequate to the task of
ensuring that women are able to take control of their own
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Ibid. at 20.
Ibid.
Ibid. at xi.
Ibid.
Ibid. at xii.

Consider, for example, the following:
Where rights-talk is abstract, democratic conversation is engaged; where rights
talk is individualistic, democratic conversation is civic; where rights-talk is le
galistic, democratic conversation is popular; where rights-talk is myopic,
democratic conversation is visionary; where rights-talk is anemic, democratic
conversation is full-blooded; where rights-talk is absolute, democratic conversa
tion is contingent; where rights-talk is exclusionary, democratic conversation is
inclusionary; where rights-talk is narrow, democratic conversation is expansive;
and where rights-talk is blunt, democratic conversation is nuanced. See ibid. at
216-217.
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bodies . . . ", Hutchinson acknowledges that its "achievements . . .
have been considerable for women in many areas of social
244
life . . . " But there is no attempt to seriously examine why this
might be so, or more particularly, how much damage this signifi
cant exception might do to his larger argument.
Moreover, as we have seen, he concedes that in a rights-dominated
regime it may be necessary to invoke the discourse of rights on the
. 1
. that an " occas1ona
. d
. ht be ach1eve
bas1s
strategic
. advantage"245 m1g
as, for example, in the Morgentaler situation. The problems here are:
a lack of specificity in mapping out the possibilities for such moves
and the danger of post hoc rationalization. Hutchinson says very
little to indicate when it might be appropriate to consider such in
terventions. The likelihood is that such strategic moves will be cau
tiously affirmed when they are 'successful' from a democratic per
spective, but ridiculed if not. But this is unhelpful for those who,
when faced with immediate and threatening problems such as por
nography or hate literature, have to decide whether to go the rights
'
246
route or not.
Indeed, at other points Hutchinson seems to buy into rights dis
course even more directly by proposing, for example, that the
"regulative ideal of dialogue incorporates both a right to hear, to be
247
heard, and to be answered. " In V.:..hat way does such a "dialogic
entitlement"248 really escape the dangers of rights discourse? As pre
sented, this seems to be something more than 'an occasional strate
gic advantage', suggesting some sort of essential juridical presupposi
tion that emanates from his dialogic thesis. Unfortunately,
Hutchinson fails to address this apparent contradiction. Thus it
244. Ibid. at 103 . See A. Dobrowolsky, "The Politics of Pragmatism: Women,
Strategic Representation and Constitutionalism in Canada" (Ph.D. Thesis, Carleton
University, 1996).
245. Cora/, supra note 5 at xiii.
246. Moreover, as one of the anonymous reviewers of this article pointed out, it is
curious that Hutchinson in a book published in 1995 which focuses in large part on
dialogues and expressions, has so little to say about cases such as R. v. Keegstra, [1990]
3 S.C.R. 697; Butler, supra note 165; and R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
2 47. Coral, supra note 5 at 212 [emphasis added].
2 48. Ibid. at 213.
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seems that perhaps greater attention needs to be focused on the dif
ferent forms rights might take, for example; legislative versus con
stitutional, legal versus moral and civic versus juridical. The more
nuanced point is that not all rights arguments are inevitably bad;
249
rather, it is that they are always dangerous.
Finally, there are also several situations when Hutchinson shifts
from the critical and normative to the empirical without adequately
considering what this mi'ght entail methodologically. For example,
Hutchinson claims that in the abortion context "law has tended to
exacerbate tensions and differences . . . "250 This is a significant claim
which depends upon an analysis of the complex relationship be
tween law, politics, gender and social change that, among other ap
proaches, might require some comparative study. Unfortunately,
Hutchinson provides no support for such an assertion. Similarly,
although he argues that it is desirable for legislatures and administra
251
tive agencies to be able to regulate corporate speech, he fails to
consider the problem of agency capture which has been the bane of
much welfarist social policymaking. Again, in a critique of
academics who propose a constitutionally protected right to beg, he
claims that "[t]hese destitute souls beg not for alms, but for an end
to their plight as hapless hostages to capitalist fortune: it is public
. as much as pnvate
.
transformat1on
chanty
. that they seek. "252 But
this proposition is unsupported by any reference to studies that
might support such a claim and carries a sense that Hutchinson is
projecting his ideological vision onto their consciousness.253

249. See P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon, 1 984) at 343.
250. Cora/, supra note 5 at 1 02.
251. Ibid. at 201.
252. Ibid. at 100.
253. Moreover, there is the danger that Hutchinson himself does what on the fol
lowing page he warns against, and what his dialogic theory more generally is de
signed to prevent: speaking on behalf of the other. Ibid. at 101.
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(ii) Substantive Concerns
Even if Hutchinson were to remedy some of the foregoing stylis
tic and methodological problems, there remain several substantive
issues. My concerns in this regard relate mostly to the incomplete
ness of some of his arguments and thus their lack of persuasiveness.
One underdeveloped argument relates to Hutchinson's concep
tion of social and political relations after the collapse of the pub
lic/private dichotomy. While he rejects the dichotomy on the basis
of its tendency to insulate large areas of personal and social interac
tion from redistributive and regulatory state intervention, he also
claims that we should not fear its abandonment because such a step
does not mean that everything will become public and he still sug254
·
of "autonomy. "
gests th at there wt·11 be a post-1·b
1 eral conception
In support he invokes the abortion debate, but the point is not fully
addressed. One might well agree with the argument that women
should have control over their bodies and that society requires sig
nificant restructuring in order to make their options genuinely un
coerced. But even if these were achievable social goals does this
mean that the state has no regulative role in relation to a fetus quite
late in a pregnancy? Hutchinson has little to say in this regard.
Clearly from the overall argument, he wants it both ways: an ex
pansive state and an enlarged realm of autonomy. I can agree that
these should not be assumed to be necessarily antithetical to each
other, and indeed that frequently they can be mutually supportive,
but this does not deny the possibility that sometimes the state will
be a threat to the autonomy of the self. Without the assistance of a
public/private discourse how are we to make decisions and justify
our reasons? One is left wondering whether Hutchinson really
wants to abandon the dichotomy or whether he would simply draw
the lines somewhat differently.
I also have concerns about Hutchinson's proposals with regard to
how we might move from rights talk and social inequality to
democratic dialogue and social equality. In his quest to divide the
254. Ibid. at 1 52-153.
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255

and critical
world between deluded and apologetic "Corafians"
256
"
,,
.
1,,251
agents provocateurs,
he portrays Conkl'm as a "trad'1t1ona
scholar and lodges him in the same camp as Beatty, accusing him of
. "259 "dewy-eyed
. .
forma1ism,
"v1S1onary
· "258 "daydream be1·1evmg,
. ,,261 and "outrageous ha11uc1-.
Cora f.1an[.ism], ,,260 "nocturnal fantas1es
.
"262
natory revenes.
I have two problems here.
First, I think that Hutchinson could have demonstrated a little
more charity in his interpretation of Conklin's project. There
could be no suggestion that Conklin is either traditional, formalis
tic or dreamy, if Hutchinson had read him in the light of his other
scholarship.263 To my mind their positions are in fact quite close:
they both want a more accountable judiciary. Where they differ
relates to their respective assessment of the current politico-juridical
context and their targeted audiences. Conklin's purpose, as I read
him, is to encourage judges to be more candid about their images of
a constitution in order to render their assumptions - social, politi
cal and ontological - much more transparent thereby making them
a little more accountabl'e. On this reading, 'image' may be just
Conklin's way of articulating in a slightly more palatable manner
(for the judiciary) what Hutchinson calls "ideology. "264 While it is
clear that this is not as radical as Hutchinson's democratic ap
proach, my point is that the difference is more one of strategic as
sessment and tactical positioning. Hutchinson may be on solid
ground if he were to criticize Conklin's strategic sense of trying to
255. Ibid. at 18.
256. Ibid. at 20.
257. Ibid. at 75.
258. Ibid. at 76.
259. Ibid. at 78.
260. Ibid.
261. Ibid. at 79.
262. Ibid. at 86.
263. See e.g. W.E. Conklin, "A Contract" in Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory,
supra note 8 at 207; W.E. Conklin, "'Access to Justice' as Access to · a Lawyer's
Language" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 454.
264. Cora/, supra note 5 at 85.
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work from within the dominant ideology as being too optimistic.
However, others could argue with equal merit that Hutchinson is
too optimistic about the possibilities of empowerment through dia
logue, or the tactical wisdom of progressives withdrawing from
constitutional litigation in the expectation that "the judicial process
might wither away as the leading institutional organ for social
policy making.''265 This might be naive because non-progressive
forces are likely to have even greater recourse to judicial review if
the field is unoccupied.
Second, in his challenge to Conklin, Hutchinson argues that im
ages do not drive decision-making, rather it is the "identity and in.
.
.
.
"266
tentions
of the JU
· dges. But this raises t he question of what ro1e
ideas play in the world of politics and law. Obviously, Hutchinson
must believe that they play some role or his own politico-academic
project would be pointless. Indeed, ohe of the most distinctive
characteristics of Hutchinson's own style of advocacy is to draw
very heavily on metaphors to persuade his audience. Moreover,
within a few pages of trashing Conklin, Hutchinson himself relies
267
upon the discourse of 'visions' to advance his own analysis.
The concept of identity does a great deal of work in Hutchinson's
analysis. Time and again he insists that judges are unsalvageable due
268
but is there not a danger of sociological
to their identity,
essentialism - an excessive reliance on the traditional Marxist apho.
.
.
.
"'269
wh·l
i e my
nsm that «·socia
• 1 b emg . . . determmes consc10usness" ,:
own position is far from idealist, in the sense that I think that our
material and existential contexts undoubtedly circumscribe our
ways of knowing the world, I also believe that we have the capacity
for self-reflexivity and that our ideologies can change as we encoun
ter new contexts and worldviews. This is something which I think
Hutchinson himself would accept given not only his postmodern
conception of the self but also his own expressed sympathy for
265. Ibid. at 182.
266. Ibid. at 82.
267. Ibid. at 90-93.
268. Ibid. at 170-171.
269. K. Marx, Selected Writings, ed. by D. Mclellan, (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1 985) at 389.
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those oppressed groups in contemporary Canadian society. How
ever, it is unclear to me why he singles out judges in particular as
being especially incapable of 'changing their spots'. i am not sug
gesting his basic thesis that judges are unlikely agents for progressive
social change is mistaken. However, what I am pointing out is that
Hutchinson needs to focus more on the question of the relationship
between identity and ideology before he dismisses judicial
consciousness-raising as one potential terrain of contestation. A
starting point for this might be a discussion of Morgentaler as a
study of shifting judicial images, visions or ideologies.
This issue of the relationship between identity, law and politics
raises another problem for Hutchinson's theory. As we know,
Hutchinson suggests that progressive lawyering entails the capacity
on the part of lawyers to curtail their own professional hubris, to
decentre their own position and take a more modest and deferential
role in political praxis. However, given that lawyers as a group tend
to share much of the same identity and ideology as their judicial su
periors, what causes Hutchinson to have any hope that they are
more likely to surrender privileged positions for some supporting
role? Stated more philosophically, what Hutchinson seems to be
missing is an account of the factors or circumstances that might
psychologically motivate lawyers (but apparently not judges) to
embrace the cause of empowered democracy. This is important
because the same problem also applies to the second prong of his
reconstructive project - the commitment to the regulative ideal of
democratic dialogue. What · makes Hutchinson think those who
currently have power, and who tend to monopolize the channels of
communication, would consent to the adoption of dialogic
processes that so manifestly undercut their own hegemony?
This problem conveniently leads me to several other concerns
that I have with his plans for a dialogic democracy. Although
Hutchinson's dialogic ethos is attractive in that it assumes a basic
substratum of commonality that makes social, political and legal co
ordination plausible, further work needs to be done if it is to be a
credible alternative. Although he is quite critical of the false promR.F. Devlin
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.
.
.
. seems to me
·
· al·ism,,270 and "umversal pnncip
ises
of "ration
les, ,,271 it
that dialogism is premised upon important rationalistic and cultur
ally ambitious assumptions. Consider, for example, Hutchinson's
conception of dialogism as a "regulative ideal."272 His claims are
large: it "incorporates a right to hear, be heard and to be answered.
It establishes and maintains · the social conditions for open-ended,
continuing and meaningful con_versations in which people engage as
.
.
· is
· premised upon "mutua1 understandmg, reequals"273 and that it
spect, a willingness to listen and to risk one's opinions and preju
274
dices, a mutual seeking of the correctness of what was said . . . ."
Within such a framework politics is envisioned as the ongoing
· "275
" negotiat
. [.ion of] a ba1 anced po1ity.
The assumptions underlying this vision seem to be that our differ
ences are essentially substantive and with new and improved soli
daristic procedures it will be possible to move towards substantive
276
reform and egalitarian justice. However, there are several prob
lems here. First, and obviously, politics and power are driven as
much by bad faith as by good faith and this reality cannot be
glossed over as quickly as · Hutchinson suggests. Seconc:l, even
assuming that parties to a politico-juridical dialogue were to operate
in good faith, there is the question of what language they are to
communicate in. The assumptions here appear to be twofold: lan
guage is equally available to all, and language is basically translat
able. Even if we were to move towards Hutchinson's egalitarian
277
for dialogue, I would suggest that not
"interactive conditions"
everyone would be able to effectively engage, either quantitatively
or qualitatively, and thus there is the danger of the "dictatorship of

270. Cora/, supra note 5 at 22, 206.
271. Ibid. at 187.
272. Ibid. at 212.
273. Ibid.
274. Ibid. at 203-204 quoting R. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1983) at 162.
275. Cora/, supra note 5 at 153.
276. Ibid. at 169.
277. Ibid. at 204.
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2
the articulate. " 78 Consequently, I would suggest that his dialogic
approach, like rights talk, is as he says "always limited and limit
2
ing" 79, "an impoverished and impoverishing medium of political
2
discourse. " 80 In the same way that rights talk could not guarantee
women control over their bodies, dialogism contains no guaran2s
tees. 1
Moreover, I wonder if there is anything in the dialogic model that
guards against majoritarianism? For example, he argues "[i]t was a
triumph of popular will that made it possible for the Supreme
Court to decide as it did i_n Morgentaler. "282 Apart from some dubi
ous echo of a Rousseauean 'general will', my concern here is for
those who do not share the popular will which, as scholars like
Beatty have argued, is the very reason for rights in the first place. In
other words, is there a danger of conflating dialogic democracy with
majoritarianism?
Secondly, although Hutchinson has a sophisticated conception of
.
.
. 1s
. 1 medmm.
. more than JUSt
"283 To my mm
1anguage, It
· d,
a "socia
language also captures and refracts specific cultural norms and prac
tices that are not always translatable.284 Hutchinson never considers
whether the dialogue should be in a language other than english, for
example french or First Nations languages. Indeed, some First
Nations scholars have explicitly argued that 'equality' and 'justice',
two concepts that are central to Hutchinson's project, are difficult

278. W. Kymlicka, "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality" (1 989) 99 Ethics
883 at 900.
279. Cora/, supra note 5 at 25.
280. Ibid. at 122.
281. Ibid. at 1 02-103.
282. Ibid. at 180.
283. Ibid. at 1 91.
284. See also R.F. Devlin, "Law, Postmodernism and Resistance: Rethinking the
Significance of The Irish Hunger Strike" (1 994) 14 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 3 at 7273.
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285
While I do not want to
to fit within aboriginal world views.
overstate the incommensurability argument, it seems to me that
this is not just a political or moral problem, which would be serious
enough, but also an epistemological one that Hutchinson fails to
consider. Furthermore, Hutchinson proposes that dialogism must
remain continually open, but again there are at least two problems
here: do most citizens really have that much time available? And at
some point, some decisions have to be made, even relatively tem
porary ones, and so some mechanisms for closure seem inevitable.
Efficiency is not everything, but nor is it nothing. Hutchinson says
little about the possibility and circumstances of closure.
Finally, there is the important question of the relationship be
tween dialogue and action. While it is true that dialogue can be a
form of action, it is also an important limitation that it is only one
form of action. If, as I have suggested, it is true that dialogism can
not go far enough in its program of greater inclusion, the difficult
question is, what are the oppressed to do when talking gets them
nowhere? Towards the end of his book, Hutchinson flirts with the
86
possibility of disruptive and activist tactics2 and the virtues of the
287
"well placed Reebok. " (Free corporate advertising?) The problem
is that this discussion is much too brief because certain forms of
action are in their nature silencing and therefore contradictory to
.
the dialogic ethos. Are they thereby ruled out? Thus it seems to me
that Hutchinson finds himself in a difficult situation: as a self-de
scribed radical he seeks dramatic social transformation; however, as
a respectable university professor he cannot be perceived as advocat
ing the direct action that might be required for such a project. In
stead he opts for dialogic democracy, and indeed in his last few
288
pages even waxes poetic. The problem with dialogism is its pri
orization of dialogue over action. It conceives of politics as some
how analogous to the almost perfect jurisprudence seminar where

285. See e.g. Monture-Angus, supra note 125; and M. Turpel, "Patriarchy and
Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian State for First Nations Women" (1993) 6
C.J .W.L. 174 at 180.
286. Coral, supra note 5 at 170.
287, Ibi.d. at 224.
288. Jbi.d. at 228-229.
132

22 Queen's Law Journal

·,

each participant has his or her say and a thousand flowers bloom.
Dialogue may be what academics do best, but is it the best possible
strategy for those who are oppressed? Thus, in the same way that
Hutchinson criticizes liberal legalism for being constitutively inca
pable of achieving the social transformations necessary to enhance
social justice, I suggest that democratic dialogism is similarly
stymied. It too is both 'limited and limiting' as an effective strategy
fo r achieving Hutchinson's expressed goal: radically egalitarian so
cial reconstruction.
In short, when we unpack it, I would suggest the premise underly
ing the dialogic model is one of liberal contractualism - a regime of
haggling, a world of offering and counteroffering, of giving and tak
ing. But this is a deeply optimistic vision for, as Carol Pateman has
pointed out, contract, rather than being the apotheosis of freedom
289
and choice, might well be a highly refined form of subordination.
In other words, by taking refuge in dialogism I am not sure that
· 1 contract"290
Hutc h.mson has manage d to escape the "Lockean soc1a
theory of which he is so critical.

Conclusion
In Part I, I indicated that Beatty and Hutchinson shared certain
commonalities: a belief in textual indeterminacy and a critique of
the record of the Supreme Court of Canada. Let me conclude by
suggesting two more: a failure to be sufficiently programmatic and
the danger of decontextualism.
On the programmatic side, Beatty seems to think that we are al
most there, that with some minor tinkering and a judicial change of
heart the integrity of law (and a socially just society) is within our
grasp. But he has very little to say about how we might achieve
289. C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
290. Cora/, supra note 5 at 186.
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such shifts. Hutchinson, on the other hand, argues that rights talk is
taking us in the wrong direction and that large scale institutional
and psychological transformations are urgently required. However,
his proposed remedy of democratic dialogue seems to me to be
unequal to the task of transition: Both authors have captured an
important constitutional sensibility - Beatty the urge for auton
omy and Hutchinson the craving for community - but each has
failed to provide an account of how, in the short term, we might be
able to make serious moves towards making either (or perhaps even
both) sensibilities effectively achievable .
Furthermore, there is the tendency towards decontextualism.
Both books are written in a passionate style and this is an un
doubted plus. However, each has a touch of the messianic and in
their desire to proselytize they each may overstate their case. Law as
a terrain of struggle is uneven and it provides different opportuni
ties and constraints for different participants in its different forms,
in different locations and at different times. Each author is aware of
this but it is underplayed in their analyses. Legal theory, as it has
been conventionally practiced, has a tendency to demand that an
author must espouse some sort of coherent argument the robust
ness of which should be compelling to all who might read it. But it
may be that law itself is too messy, too complicated, too chaotic
and too problematic to allow us to say yes or no. There may be no
easy answers that can be captured by unidimensional appeals to ei
ther universal principles or dialogic practices. But we should be
grateful to both Beatty and Hutchinson for providing us with their
respective visions: neither is compelling but both are thought pro
voking. What more could we ask for? Truth? Eh?
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